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More than any ancient writer, Plato de-
pends on argument by analogy for the explanation of his
doctrines; “this was because he treated so largely of the un-
seen and intangible.”1 Starting in book 1 of the Laws, and
referenced elsewhere, Plato’s Athenian Stranger introduces
an extended metaphor whereby human beings are likened to
“puppets of the gods” or “divine marvels” (thauma . . .
theion).2 Occurring in the context of theorizing about law,
this is a key element of an unusually metaphysical discussion
within a text that, on the surface at any rate, deals less in
metaphysics than earlier works, although it frequently al-
ludes to, and presupposes, an understanding of Platonic phi-
losophy and metaphysics. The aim here is to examine this
cryptic metaphor in context and in the light of relevant
scholarship in order to unpack its significance. It touches on
a number of subjects ranging from Plato’s concept of the
controlled drinking party and issues surrounding sexual de-
sire to the broader workings of the psychê. On the one hand,
it functions within the realm of Platonic metaphysics regard-
ing representation and, as such, connects with the Theory of
Forms. On the other, it partakes more broadly of ancient
Greek and Near Eastern traditions concerning puppetry and
its place in religious and mystical rites. Appropriate to both
of these topoi, the allegorical “puppets of the gods” motif
entails a number of Pythagorean elements as well.
This metaphor is introduced at Laws 644d7 ff. Plato’s
Athenian Stranger is discussing the impact on human beings
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of expectations about the future, fear, and calculation. The
last one of these, (logismos), also renderable as “reckoning,”
is identified with Reason’s “golden cord” that guides the
psychai of mortals along the correct path.3 “When logismos
has become the dogma of the polis,” says the Athenian
Stranger, “it is named nomos [law].”4 His interlocutors re-
quest further elaboration and he says:
Let us conceive of it in the following way. Let us suppose that
each of us living creatures is a puppet of the gods, whether contrived
as some kind of toy or for some serious purpose; for as to that we
know nothing, but we do know that these inner affections of ours,
like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to one an-
other, pull against each other in opposing actions. And herein re-
sides the dividing line between good and evil. For, as our argument
declares, there is one of these pulling forces which every person
should always follow and in no way leave hold of, counteracting
thereby the pull of the other cords. It is this leading golden and holy
string of calculation that is titled the public law of the state.5
The Laws is dominated by the notion that the (true) law-
giver is divinely inspired and that the law itself is the work
of divinity.6 The word translated as “puppet” here, thauma,
literally means “marvel.”7 And a thauma theion would be
some kind of “divine marvel” or a “marvel of the gods”; al-
though, from the context, it is clear that he is referring to
puppets, or specifically marionettes, about which I shall dis-
cuss more below. In this metaphor, a recognizable Platonic
formula emerges whereby one who yields to the baser
“iron” cords is considered “self-inferior” and one who
obeys the “golden cord” is “self-superior.”8 The baser ones
are of iron, presumably because, unlike gold, iron rusts; and
he may also be making an offhanded allusion here to Hes-
iod’s degenerate Age of Iron in the Works and Days.9 This
psychological theory, and its tangible illustration in the fable
of the puppets, illuminates the nature of “self-mastery” that
has been promoted as a paradigm for virtue since the incep-
tion of the dialogue (626e2–6, 633d5–e6). Victory over
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one’s self, even if apparently paradoxical prima facie,
amounts to victory of the “better” part of the psychê over
the “worse” (626e7–627d4).10
While Plato’s “puppets of the gods” metaphor represents
fundamental features of his philosophy, it also entails nu-
merous layers of complexity not readily accessible to the
modern reader. In order to better appreciate this metaphor,
firstly, some insights into ancient puppetry, contemporary
with Plato’s era, are essential. Ancient Greek puppets appear
to have come in at least four types: shadow puppets, stick
puppets, marionettes on strings, and more complex mari-
onettes, also controlled by a puppeteer using strings or
cords. All of these have Near Eastern origins apart, perhaps,
for the last one which may have been a wholly Greek inven-
tion, albeit derived in part out of earlier, foreign traditions.
In the 6th century bc, Persian magi came into Greece and
used puppets in their rituals, which soon began to resemble
those of the indigenous mystery cults.11 It is difficult to tell
which tradition most influenced the other in this respect; it
may have been wholly mutual. Greek puppetry may also
have been influenced by other Near Eastern mystical prac-
tices. Herodotus refers to Egyptian women engaging in or-
giastic fertility rituals with what he calls “Dionysiac”
puppets (thauma). He describes these as “two feet long,
moved by strings, which are carried about the villages by the
women, with the male member moving and nearly as big as
the rest of the body.”12 We also have evidence from the Clas-
sical period of sorcerers using shadow puppets for public
performances of their magic.13 These varied from harmless
spectacles or “marvels” (the name often used for puppets,
thauma, pl. thaumata) to blessings and curses. Greek pup-
pets were not exclusively for ritualistic operations but no
less still bore mystical significance inasmuch as they often
represented individual gods and heroes who were sacred.14
Shadow puppets and marionettes were both used in drama-
tized scenes from the Iliad and Odyssey. Though these
shows would have been aimed largely at an audience of chil-
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dren, the religious connotations of such representations
would seem apparent, given the subject matter. 
Ancient puppets could be fairly sophisticated in design. Ar-
istotle describes the working of 4th century marionettes, say-
ing that “the movements of animals may be compared with
those of automatic puppets, which are set going on the occa-
sion of a tiny movement; the levers are released, and strike
the twisted strings against one another.”15 This and other
passages from Aristotle have led some to believe that Plato’s
“puppets of the gods” must be some type of wind-up au-
tomata rather than marionettes, which has been the domi-
nant view to date. Annas writes that “Plato is thinking, not
of puppets on strings, but of toys which move around by
themselves (a kind of clockwork wind-up toy).”16 She derives
this in no small part from the work of Berryman who has
demonstrated that such things existed, at least from Aristo-
tle’s era onwards, and which could also be referred to as
thaumata.17 If it were the case that Plato meant “clockwork
wind-up toys,” then it would seem to bear out the analogy to
a point inasmuch as human beings with souls are self-moved
movers rather than puppets animated by an external, physi-
cal agency. However, for Plato the psychê is a manifestation
of divinity and animates human bodies in much the same
way as a puppeteer might do with his thauma. Berryman her-
self cites a shift in significance of the puppet model in later
antiquity, from an image of self-movement to one of simply
mechanical, automatic movement.18 Clockwork automata
are not self-moved movers. They are clearly set in motion by
something else, crucially, to which they are not still con-
nected. For Plato, the psychê itself, or that aspect of it that is
connected to divinity, is the puppeteer, its “golden cord” di-
rectly partaking of the Form of the Good, insofar as such un-
expressibles may be put into words.
For the analogy in the Laws to work, especially given that
there are various “strings” or “cords” involved, pulling
sometimes in different directions, a marionette would seem
to be the more appropriate image rather than a wind-up toy.
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The Athenian Stranger says that his thauma is pulled by
neura or mêrinthoi. LSJ define neura (singular neuron) as
“strings” or “cords of sinew”; mêrinthoi are “cords, lines or
strings.”19 Neura can also refer to the tendons of the feet,
cords made of sinew used for stringing bows as well as,
more metaphorically, the “sinews” or “vigorous” strains of
rhythm in lyric odes. The musical double-meaning is perhaps
intentional given the Athenian Stranger’s frequent play on
the word nomos, meaning both “law” (as in the title of his
treatise, Nomoi, the Laws) and “musical note.”20 It would
therefore not be too much of a stretch in referring to them as
“chords” rather than “cords,” keeping the word play in
English. The “golden c(h)ord,” then, might be a reference to
the Pythagorean “golden ratio” that produces the “harmony
of the spheres” and connects with a host of other notions
consonant with Plato’s analogy here.21
It is possible that ancient Greek wind-up toys had strings,
acting as sinews, in order to articulate their limbs comparable
to those attached to a marionette. However, these would have
been purely functional, within the automaton and likely not
pulling the toy in different directions from an external source.
Even so, I do not dismiss Annas’ claim outright because Plato
may be referring to a sophisticated type of puppet (neu-
rospaston) that had internal strings, recalling the “inner affec-
tions” to which the cords are compared in his metaphor,
acting like human sinews. But they would still have been ani-
mated by external agency, whether from above or on the same
level, from a kind of control box operated by a puppeteer.22
These were truly “marvels” and were of special interest to the
Roman-era physician Galen: “This is the device, I believe, that
is used in moving [images] with cords; for passing over their
articulations, the cords are fastened to the beginning of the
parts beyond, so that the [images] readily obey the force of
the upward pull when the cords are tightened.”23
This kind of puppet would have been most similar to a hu-
man being, in terms of anatomical likeness, and capable of
mimicking human movements in a realistic manner. Plato
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does not appear to be referring to wind-up automata here. A
puppet or marionette necessitates a puppet master and, in
the case of that which pulls the golden cord (or chord), it is
the Form of the Good, via the psychê, albeit having to com-
pete with the “iron strings” of the appetites.
We have other examples of marvels of a comparable na-
ture. The god Hephaestus was said to have produced a num-
ber of automata.24 Pindar’s seventh Olympian Ode describes
animated “images” from Rhodes and Crete “like living,
moving creatures, and their fame was profound.”25 Plato
himself discusses moving statues said to have been con-
structed by the mythical Daedalus.26 Aristotle reported that
Democritus described statues that were made to move by
pouring quicksilver, analogous to the human psychê, into
them.27 If such a thing existed, it may have been moved by
magnets. And, although after Plato’s era, Pliny the Elder de-
scribes a statue of iron, another “marvel,” suspended in
space by magnets at the Temple of Arsinoe in 3rd century bc
Alexandria.28 In the same city, but in the 1st century ad, we
have Hieron’s “programmable” moving cart, along with
other moving statues that used pneumatics, which were
probably based on earlier work by Archimedes.29 All of
these may be referred to as thaumata, “marvels” or thau-
matapoioi, which “encompasses conjuring, acrobatics, jug-
gling, and marionette-shows or, in other words, any kind of
performance that produced baffled amazement in specta-
tors.”30 But none quite seem to fit the description of Plato’s
thauma in the Laws as well as that of the complex mari-
onette, the neurospaston, assuming that it existed in his life-
time and that he was aware of it in some capacity.
two other instances of puppets recur in the Laws. In the
first of these, Plato’s narrator is not using the “puppets of the
gods” metaphor per se but merely associating puppetry with
activities that induce base pleasure. At 658c–d, the Athenian
Stranger discusses regulations on public performances. He
says that if there were no limits imposed on the type of per-
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formance, and the greatest prize were to be given to that
which provokes the greatest pleasure in the audience, then a
puppet show might win out over a Homeric rhapsode, how-
ever skilled. If children were the judges of such a competi-
tion, they would certainly award the highest prize to the
puppet show (658c11–13). He concedes that a musical per-
formance ought to give pleasure; but, it should be a carefully
controlled type of pleasure that wins out over baser kinds.
Letting the uneducated judge such things corrupts both them
and the performance itself, which will then always incline to-
wards the baser elements of entertainment. Only the edu-
cated can judge correctly and the Athenian Stranger defines
education here as “guiding children towards that principle
which is pronounced correct by law” (ton hupo tou nomou
logon orthon) and confirmed by their elders who are the
most just.31 The definition of a just man here, much as in the
Republic, is concomitant with Reason’s rule of the psychê.
So, in (re-)admitting the representative arts into his Magne-
sia, Plato imposed strict regulations on them and, as with the
puppet metaphor, he linked correct and acceptable performa-
tive behavior with law and the rule of Reason.
The final reference to puppets in the Laws (804b) does di-
rectly allude back to the earlier metaphor of human beings as
“puppets of the gods” and illustrates how a skillful legislator
can utilize this feature of human psychology in order to
achieve philosophically motivated ends. It also reveals that,
as is suggested in the discussion of controlled symposia (see
below), not all such “puppets” are necessarily capable of fol-
lowing the “golden cord” without some outside assistance.
The Athenian Stranger is here deliberating over the types of
acceptable pastimes for his hypothetical Magnesians and
these will include sacrificing, singing, and dancing, which will
allow them to “win divine favors and also to repel and defeat
enemies in battle.”32 Magnesian boys and girls will put on ar-
mor and perform choral dances both to entertain the public
as well as to hone their fighting skills.33 These armed per-
formances are derived in part from the Kretan games of ar-
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mor of the Kuretes, the games of the Spartan Dioskuri (Kas-
tor and Pollux), and those of Athena the Virgin at Athens.34
There are two kinds of dances identified in the Laws as beau-
tiful and good: the warlike Pyrrhic and the peaceful Em-
meleia. The Pyrrhic variety, which represents the “motion of
fighting, and . . . of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in vi-
olent effort,” is specifically considered to promote courage;
the Emmeleia, or pacific dances, signify “the motion of a
temperate soul living in a state of prosperity and moderate
pleasures” and, as such, this type promotes the underlying
morality of Magnesia.35 Indecent dances are identified as
those that concern ugly bodies and reflect negative mentali-
ties along with those that incline one towards comic laugh-
ter.36 Aristotle was critical of Plato’s insistence in this regard
on a kind of moderation that approached austerity in the
Laws, saying that it would be better to live both “with mod-
eration and liberally” as well.37 The plan for Magnesia com-
pares well with the musical education outlined in the
Republic and generally follows Socrates’ discussion there.38
Different types of music were regarded, not just by Plato but
by the ancient Greeks more broadly, as promoting certain
character types and feelings. Some varieties of the Lydian
mode were seen as mournful, the Ionian relaxing, and, more
importantly here, the Dorian and Phrygian have been consid-
ered by Plato’s narrators to inspire self-control and
courage.39 The use of music to influence human emotions
and behavior also, we are told, interested the Pythagoreans.40
The rhythms and modes of musical accompaniment for
the Magnesian performances are designed to impart appro-
priate characteristics through the process of imitative learn-
ing. This is “serious play” designed to condition the citizens
to have respect for religion as well as martial values
(803d2–3). It is also a type of social engineering based on
Plato’s understanding of human psychology. The Athenian
Stranger indicates that, backed by religious indoctrination,
these games will “thus mould their lives according to the
shape of their nature, insofar as they are puppets for the
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most part, but partake occasionally of the truth.”41 His
Spartan interlocutor, Megillus, comments at this point that
the Athenian Stranger must have a very low opinion of the
human race to require so much compulsion for good behav-
ior. He counters, saying that his mind was on divine matters
and that he was swept up by emotion during this discussion
but that humanity is not really so mean. Even so, compul-
sion remains a principal tool that will be used to encourage
correct behavior. The citizens should always make decisions
guided by the “golden cord” of wisdom, and while this is to
be aimed at, some will require coercion no less.42 The insti-
tutions and laws of Magnesia, their preambles, and the sys-
tem of education itself will “enchant” the subjects, working
a kind of counter-magic against negative impulses.43
the “puppets of the gods” metaphor in the Laws recalls
the myth of the Two Horses in the Phaedrus (246b ff.) and
should in all likelihood be read with regard to it. The latter
specifically offers an analogy of the effects of erôs on the psy-
chê. All of the Platonic corpus, perhaps abridged appropriately
to the level of the reader, will be required reading in the hypo-
thetical Magnesia of the Laws, and the puppets metaphor
would appear to be an intertextual reference to the two horses
myth.44 The descriptions of erôs from the Symposium and the
Phaedrus remain consistent throughout Plato’s works. There is
also evidence that the Phaedrus itself may have been written
fairly late in Plato’s life and, as such, would have been devel-
opmentally closer to the Laws.45 It is noteworthy too that this
narrative on erôs comes as part of a greater discussion by
Socrates on the immortality of the soul—which resurfaces at
Laws 714a, 894b ff. and 966d–967d, and is metaphysically
connected with the puppets metaphor.47
In the Phaedrus myth, the human psychê is likened to two
winged steeds being steered by a person in a flying chariot.
The souls of gods are considered altogether good and free
from any discord. But humans are afflicted by erôs, which is
always in a discordant state between Want and Resource.
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Thus it is deemed to be some kind of lesser spirit in the Sym-
posium. The souls of mortals, by contrast, have these two
“horses” of which one is wholly good and noble and the
other possesses the opposite inclinations (246b). They gener-
ate Strife between them—one tending toward the Good and
the other toward its opposite. When, for instance, one be-
holds a “lovable vision,” the other contemplates using force
(thus the presence of hybrizein at 253e3), desiring to “leap
on” the beloved (254a2–3). Such urges, apparently irre-
ducible in human beings, must be vigorously suppressed and
“modest restraint” must prevail. But our darker side (typi-
fied by the “black horse”) will also try seduction, approach-
ing the attractive youth, attempting to persuade him with
the pleasures of sex, the “things of Aphrodite.”47 Again,
there is a clear sense of “self-inferior” and “self-superior”
depending on which metaphorical horse gains the lead. 
This duality within the soul generates conflict and presents
a problem for the “charioteer” trying to steer his soul aright.
The two principles of action distinguished within it are an in-
nate desire for pleasures (epithumia) and an acquired judg-
ment (doxa) which aims at what is best.48 These two
psychical forces may agree or, more often, be in dispute; if the
latter, then one or the other will prevail.49 When good judg-
ment has mastery, it leads the soul toward that which is ra-
tionally “best.” This is synonymous with self-mastery and
moderation (sôphrosynê). The rule of the opposite inclina-
tion, desire for indulgence in “base” things, drags the soul ir-
rationally toward the perpetual and compulsive gratification
of excessive desires.50 A definition of erôs thereby arises from
the Phaedrus in the following words of Plato’s Socrates:
For when Desire (epithumia), having gained mastery in the absence
of logical judgment (which urges one toward what is right), bears
one toward pleasure with regard to beautiful things, and, in turn
with desires kindred to itself, it then rushes on the beauty of bod-
ies, conquering in its mode of conduct, taking its name from the
force itself—this is called erôs.51
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The dominance of erôs may thus be construed as a “state
in which a certain species of desire prevails over Reason.”52
These rival impulses always threaten to distract and con-
found the lover.53 There is here a sense of the intellectual
limitations—a lack of calculation—to be found in the lower
parts of the psychê that is more consistent with the bipartite
model of the soul found in the Laws (as opposed to the tri-
partite model of the Reason-ruled, the Honor-loving, and
the Appetitive parts in the Republic). The horse that repre-
sents the appetites is “shaggy-eared, devoid of sense and
barely yielding to the whip and goad together” (235e4–5).
And, as Bobonich indicates, “it is trained only by the use of
force, not by words of command.” 54 This recourse to com-
pulsion in order to rein in the appetites, as we have seen, is
compatible with the plan to encourage the human “puppets”
in the Laws to follow the lead of the “golden cord.” 
In that text, the Athenian Stranger describes a virtually
identical situation in which a lover wishes to enjoy the pleas-
ures of his beloved whilst his Reason at the same time for-
bids it. One who craves the body of his beloved “as if he
were so much ripe fruit” (hôras kathaper opôras—note the
pun) does so “without giving a thought to the character of
his darling’s soul.”55 Desire can have as its object either
Beauty/the Good or something “base” and “bodily.” Judg-
ment may, of course, rein in “improper” yearnings (which, if
left unchecked, encourage a state of yielding to excess) and
beget wisdom in one through “divine philosophy.”56 How-
ever, Phaedrus 237d4–5, recollecting Diotima’s speech in the
Symposium (204b ff.), argues that all desire is really desire
for the Beautiful/Good—however misdirected or otherwise.
The “horse” that inclines against the Good (an agent of
Strife) corresponds to the mortal part of human beings that
fails, through ignorance and through not surpassing its own
limitations, to be attracted to the proper object—namely, the
Beautiful/Good. 
Any form of erôs, even that which desires the Good as its
object, still has the dubious distinction of being a type of
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“madness” (manias).57 This is potentially problematic be-
cause the definition holds not only for human love-objects,
but a comparable form of manias is also positively associated
with both philosophy and mystical practices. Its convergence
with nous in erôs is intriguing and has some bearing on the
mystical attributes of puppetry, to which I shall presently
turn.58 Pieper objects to “madness” as the meaning of manias
here due to the fact that it “suggests ties with the orgiastic
Dionysian rites.”59 However, this was apparently not a prob-
lem for Plato. There is ample evidence that such orgiastic,
Dionysian rites were agreeable to his narrators. Indeed, the
Athenian Stranger even recommends a sort of “Dionysiac
treatment” for mothers to use in putting babies to sleep at
Laws 790e, and, at Republic 479d–e, Socrates informs Glau-
con that the revelers at Dionysiac festivals bear a certain like-
ness to philosophers. This issue has also been touched upon
at Symposium 218b, inasmuch as Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryxi-
machus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes and Socrates
are all said to have had a taste of this philosophic species of
Bacchic “madness.” In the Laws, we have a comparable in-
stance in which the Athenian Stranger praises “divine erotic
passion” (erôs theios) for producing prudence and justice
that, again, seems to stand awkwardly alongside the negative
manifestations of manias (711d6 ff.). We are left with a con-
ceptualization in which one type of madness is acceptable
and another is not. Nonetheless, it is clear in the Phaedrus
that the rule of the appetites in the soul is seen as a particu-
larly malevolent variety of manias.
Madness is one altered state that interested Plato, with
both positive and negative implications; intoxication is an-
other. The puppet metaphor in the Laws is applied directly
to Plato’s plan for controlled drinking parties (or educa-
tional symposia) and, at 645d, he asks what the effects
would be on such a “puppet” if given an intoxicant such as
alcohol. The idea is to test and condition an individual’s re-
sistance to the baser “cords” when their inhibitions are low-
ered and thus, by extension, to enhance their self-discipline
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when sober. The hypothetical Magnesians are not permitted
to partake of alcohol until the age of eighteen and are en-
couraged to drink only in moderation until old age, after
which they are granted somewhat greater latitude.60 In fact,
the elderly are encouraged to drink more or less as much as
they please, as a kind of comfort in old age, and also to sing
together whilst drunk. 
The controlled drinking party is an institution designed to
inculcate rational restraint. It will educate the citizens into
being courageous in the face of physical danger and also to
discourage them from illicit pleasures.61 A good legislator
can make a person proof against all manner of negatively
identified things, says the Athenian Stranger, “by putting him
into a state of fear within the strictures of law” (647c3–4).
This is half the battle. The subjects may overcome cowardice
when faced with peril but must also learn to be moderate and
have self-control sufficient to stave off the desires for activi-
ties deemed shameless, which include such erotic excesses as
identified in the Phaedrus myth and elsewhere.62 The educa-
tional symposia are to promote the official values associated
with sôphrosynê (moderation) and to encourage andreia—
courageousness, specially defined here as proof against both
fear and temptation. In keeping with the overall educational
theme of Magnesia, three powerful forces will be brought to
bear in achieving this: fear, shame, and calculation (logis-
mos). The Athenian Stranger notes that drunken individuals
sometimes require strong, negative reinforcements, such as
the threat of displeasure from authority-figures, along with
the public reproach that this may accrue, in order to behave
properly. If a reveler is not willing “to obey those [in charge]
and the officials of Dionysos, who are aged upwards of sixty
years, then he must bear shame equal to and greater than
those who are disobedient to the commanders who are the
officials of Ares, the god of war.”63 Shame, through dishonor
(or the threat thereof), figures prominently in the equation
and is part of the compulsion that will be used to ensure that
the puppets heed the pull of the golden cord.64
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this puppet metaphor connects with other features of both
Platonic metaphysics and mystical beliefs regarding repre-
sentation which reveal it in a different light. In order to ap-
proach it, we must first consider what Plato and others
thought about puppetry, qua representation, and the impli-
cations thereof. Puppets’ close semblance to living things,
and the mystical traditions associated with them, troubled
the great philosopher. This is borne out in a number of in-
stances and the connection between puppets and magic is
amply present here. Puppets were seen as connected some-
how to that which they represented; and representation itself
was considered to entail magical qualities.
Despite his anxieties over the dangers of (mis)representa-
tion, Plato made frequent recourse to analogies, metaphors,
and the arts of representation—although, in his hands, we
presume, these would have been safely administered. Not so
by others. In the Sophist, he writes: “what can be the secret
of this magical power (thauma) of sophistry?”65 He is not
talking about puppets here but uses the same term that he
has employed elsewhere for them, thauma, in the context of
sophistic persuasion, itself relying on representational leg-
erdemain, and implying a kind of magical quality about it.
Picking up on the aforementioned use of puppets in mystical
rituals, Socrates in the Republic refers to “soothsayers” who
“are masters of spells and enchantments that constrain the
gods to serve their ends.”66 They do so with representative
images of these, given that representation itself was consid-
ered to have had profound magical connotations. This ex-
tends to drama in particular and, again in the Republic, we
are told that “the painting of scenes is nothing short of witch-
craft, and so too is jugglery and many other such con-
trivances.”67 The shadow puppets, a secondary metaphor
used in the Myth of the Cave (Rep. 514b ff.), accrue negativ-
ity since they are being used to fool the inmates into thinking
that they are seeing what is real, when they are only seeing
shadows of representations at best.68 In the Laws, the Athen-
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ian Stranger even legislates against the magical practice of
doing harm to others by means of wax manikins, ancient pre-
cursors of voodoo dolls, set up in the victim’s doorway.69
This last reference, along with other passages from the Re-
public and the Laws, have led some scholars, like E. R.
Dodds, to maintain that Plato was skeptical of magic and
sought to stamp it out, perceiving it as a threat to society.70
Indeed, the prohibition against using magic to cause harm to
others in the Laws was later deployed in support of the per-
secution of many so-called witches in the Early-Modern era.
Dodds says that Plato was “one of the very few ancient writ-
ers who had the intellectual courage to express scepticism on
that subject,” and he even goes as far as to maintain that he
lacked any “serious belief in the personal gods of Greek
mythology and Greek cult,” despite Wilamowitz-Möllen-
dorf’s tentative assertion to the contrary.71 In keeping with
the Zeitgeist of his own era, Dodds considers Plato to have
been “agnostic” on the matter; and yet, both the “puppets of
the gods” metaphor and other issues more generally sur-
rounding representation suggest otherwise. Plato’s whole
philosophical project in the Laws is grounded in a magiste-
rial assertion that truth must control representation rather
than vice versa.72 He also appears to have believed that rep-
resentations could be magically deployed in order to alter
and affect reality. A representation somehow “partakes” of
that which it represents in much the same way as earthly par-
ticulars “partake” of the Forms. The two are seen as con-
nected and the manipulation of one is thought to influence
the other. This is a basic definition of sorcery, and one which
our own Age of Reason sought to dispel but which has resur-
faced in more modern theories of gravitation and quantum
entanglement: action at a distance. It is impossible to know
what Plato believed, but his writings suggest some kind of ac-
ceptance of the magical as well as an advanced ethical posi-
tion concerning its use. Plato’s treatment of the dramatic arts
particularly illustrates his obsession with the magical powers
of representation—and there too we find more puppets.
Kenneth Royce Moore 125
Moore_29Sep2014_Layout 1  9/29/14  10:14 AM  Page 125
In Athenian dramas, and presumably throughout the
whole of ancient Greece, a statue of a god would be lowered
onto the stage by a crane (mechanê) when its presence was
required in the play. It is somehow appropriate that our best
source on this happens to be Plato.73 His Socrates in the Re-
public criticized what he considered to be inappropriate rep-
resentations of the gods by poets as both blaspheming and
setting bad examples for the young (377e–392c). There is
every reason to believe that dramatic representations of the
gods as suspended statues would have equally concerned
him. When the god was thus represented, an actor behind
the scenes would sonorously chant its lines, imparting to it a
further, super-human quality. This appears to have been the
rule for most plays; although in Aristophanes’ Frogs and Eu-
ripides’ Bacchae, an actor would have played the role of
Dionysus in most scenes. In the latter play, a suspended
statue would have probably been used for Dionysus in the
denouement when he drops his human guise and metes out
his judgments and punishments. A statue of a god on a crane
is strikingly similar to a puppet or marionette on strings; al-
though we do not know if these were also articulated for
movement, it would not be surprising if they were. Repre-
senting the god as a kind of puppet symbolically draws the
deity into the scene and at once lends an appropriate degree
of divine distance to it as well, since it is not then played by
a human actor. Given that Athenian stage drama itself tran-
spired within a religious context, there is every reason to ex-
pect that these instances of the deus ex machina would have
been regarded as partaking of the realm of the supernatural. 
The fact that Plato has chosen to remark on this phenom-
enon in two dialogues, albeit in passing, alludes to his keen
interest in, and apprehension for, mimetic drama. His con-
cern with representation is clearly observable in the Repub-
lic where his Socrates bans it altogether (398a). Drama is
re-admitted in the Laws, but only under the strictest of rules
governing what and who may or may not be represented
and in what permissible manner. Representation, like the
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sophist’s speech, has the power to change people’s minds. It
is in no small part on account of their innate diversity of po-
tentially conflicting messages in their representations that
popular dramatic performances and emotive poetry are at
odds with the state-espoused ideal of “masculine unity” in
the Laws.74 The perceived feminine quality of poikilia,
“multiplicity” or “multifacetedness,” which makes women’s
experience and behavior a particularly interesting subject for
drama, is deemed a potentially hazardous moral example.75
And yet, Plato appreciated that drama has an educative po-
tential which makes it too useful to dispense with altogether. 
The Athenian Stranger in the Laws recognized, long be-
fore Chomsky, that learning institutions and contexts may
serve as an effective “filtering system for alternative truths,”
although he probably would not have acknowledged that
there could be any “truth” other than the Truth per se.76
The inclusion or exclusion of given ideas in accredited
schools and the representative arts allows the polis a power-
ful lever with which to exert control over meaning and,
hence, thought. The Athenian Stranger applies this principle
of ideological censorship to most aspects of his educational
programme. Potentially “dangerous” subjects merit the most
intense regulation by Magnesian legislators in a manner al-
most identical to that of the Republic. In both it and the
Laws aesthetics and the mimetic arts are subordinated to a
morality that serves a rigidly-defined ontological notion of
the cosmos and its incumbent metaphysics.77
There is a notable change in his position, however, inasmuch
as some dramatic modes are to be granted a degree of legiti-
macy in the second-best state that were altogether excluded
from Kallipolis.78 A solution had to be found to address the
problem of dangerous representations. The censorship of
drama and literature will be one of the most pervasive means
of compulsion used on Magnesia’s human “puppets.” For-
eign dramatic performances in particular will be highly sus-
pect and safeguards will be employed against the threat of
external artistic influences that could “damage” the Magne-
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sians’ psychai. These hypothetical citizens will assiduously
study their own laws as a means of improving civic virtue
and to develop and enhance their ability to discern logoi with
the aid of philosophical reason (957c–d). This will provide
them with an “antidote” or “magical potion” (alexiphar-
makon) against alien discourses, and it echoes Socrates’ state-
ments on the nature of written texts as pharmaka that
influence the psychê in the Phaedrus.79 The Magnesians will
memorize much of the law code and study the official canon
of literature (the Platonic corpus) since these will serve as a
perpetual standard against which all other modes of dis-
course and thought are to be measured.80 The term phar-
maka has decidedly magical connotations and here Plato is
using it, both metaphorically and literally, to counter the
“bad magic” implicit in negative representations.81
As part of their education, it will be necessary for Magne-
sia’s citizens to learn about comedy so that they know to
avoid imitating such ludicrous behavior themselves.82 In the
Republic, Plato apparently did not think that watching
comedies could help in learning the nature of base and
ridiculous characters.83 However, his Socrates does indicate
there that it is necessary for the citizens of the Kallipolis to
know about “base” and “mad” people so as to avoid imita-
tion of them, and this policy has been further expanded for
Magnesia.84 The rationale in the Laws is scrupulously di-
dactic and, as Golden aptly puts it, comedy is permitted only
because of “the necessity of learning the nature of the noble
through the nature of its opposite, the ridiculous.”85 As with
other types of employment, citizens will not be allowed to
become actors since this is deemed to be harmful to their
pursuit of aretê. Slaves and foreigners will be hired to per-
form in this capacity. “Only the “good” may write come-
dies,” as Nightingale indicates, “presumably because they
alone will use ridicule correctly.”86 Anyone who writes a
comedy for Magnesia (and he appears to be referring to cit-
izens only here) must be over the age of fifty and must have
been granted the approval of the archôn for Education
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(829c–d, 936a–b). Aspiring authors must also have attained
some official esteem in the eyes of the city before they will be
permitted to air their artistic visions (829c–d). 
As concerns the genre of drama in general, the Athenian
Stranger states that “no serious attention should be granted
to it nor should any free man or woman be seen learning it”
for purposes of imitation.87 Citizens who choose to do so
must be mindful of public scrutiny. They would probably
not be expected to take their dramatic interests too seriously
except insofar as they produce an officially acceptable and
appropriately didactic script. Their style of dramatic compo-
sition must be particularly virtuous.88 One then wonders
whether any of the Magnesians would have the inclination
to compose drama. While the Athenian Stranger does allow
for this eventuality, he is insistent that comedies must “never
be allowed to ridicule any of the citizens, either in words or
by way of mimêsis, whether it be with or without pas-
sion.”89 This reflects a comparable argument in the Repub-
lic in which the acting of such roles fosters the behaviors, in
both actors and spectators, which are found in the persons
being imitated (395c–397e). Neither should an audience de-
rive too much pleasure from Magnesian stage productions.
The “correct and laudable species of pleasure” will result
simply from artistic representations of moral truth such as in
the dramatic portrayal of virtuous individuals.90 Only non-
citizens or purely fictional characters that have no dis-
cernible analogues in Magnesia may be subject to comedy’s
piquant wit. Even these are required to be moderate and
mockery will not be permitted at all in comedy. Magnesian
comedies might end up being similar to the later Satires of
the Roman poet Horace, whose dry and largely apolitical
character was designed “to win acceptance in the face of
conservative taste.”91
Plato distrusted poets because they told lies and whipped
up irrational emotions.92 Even so, as we have seen, he has
revised his views to a point in the Laws—this time keeping
the poets on a tight leash. The Athenian Stranger indicates
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that some poetic works of tragedy and serious drama may be
acceptable so long as they do not teach harmful lessons that
might destabilize the Magnesian peace.93 He has composed
some lines to answer any would-be dramatic performers
seeking a stage in Magnesia:
Most excellent of strangers, we ourselves, to the best of our ability
produce tragedy altogether the fairest and the best; indeed all our
constitution has been framed as a representation of the most beau-
tiful and best life that, in reality, we assert to be the truest
tragedy.94
This preamble to the law may be just another “fable,” a
paramyth designed to back up state policy as being for the
benefit of the populace.95 But it appears to serve more than
a purely propagandistic function. While at once excluding
foreign artistic influences in much the same way as in the
Republic, it may be read as a statement of belief that holds
Magnesia and its laws to be the paradigmatic expression of
aesthetic and philosophical virtue—a paradigm compared to
which, and with regard to which, all other (lesser) works of
art must be judged. Here Plato not only denies that conven-
tional tragedy is truly serious but bestows on his own cre-
ation the designation of “serious tragedy.”96 Platonic
tragedy, then, represents a triumph over traditional tragedy
that evoked pity and fear; rather, it points toward what is
“true and good.”97 And, as the Kallipolis in the Republic
symbolized the best arrangement of the psychê in a human
being, the literary representation of Magnesia in the Laws is
considered the best polity achievable by human beings
which imparts to them its own qualities of goodness and vice
versa. The book, in some magical way, is the polis.
In a political sense, a comparison may be drawn between
the Athenian Stranger’s speech on the “truest tragedy” and
Perikles’ Funeral Oration in which the Athenian constitution
was referred to as both a model, and an “education,” for all
the Greeks.98 Toynbee and Ober both maintain that Plato
was here reacting specifically against the Funeral Oration.99
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It should be noted, however, that he has probably not writ-
ten this or any part of the Laws in direct response to a
speech given fifty years prior. It is more likely that he was re-
sponding to the reception of this same speech in Thucydides
and, moreover, to the views contained therein. A comparison
of the Athenian Stranger’s points here with passages from
pseudo-Xenophon’s “Old Oligarch” makes it clear enough
that Plato is airing some longstanding conservative preju-
dices against a contemporary interpretation of Athenian
democracy and the source of its strength—its navy.100 This
view can be traced back to other similar attitudes from the
fifth century, the height of the Athenian Empire, and Plato
appears to have found it sufficiently intolerable as to explic-
itly forbid his Magnesians from imitating Athens specifically
in terms of its naval power or its imperialist ambitions.101
but plato’s concerns with representation and imitation go
further still. His conception of representation as intrinsically
magical is analogous to earlier Pythagorean and Orphic po-
sitions. It follows from a Pythagorean construction, found in
the fragments of Empedokles and elsewhere, that “like at-
tracts like,” where thought itself is treated as somehow fun-
damentally connected with the material elements about
which one is thinking.102 This runs contrary to Aristotle’s in-
terpretation that cognition entails only a compositional like-
ness between subjects and objects.103 The principle of “like
attracts like” was applied universally, as can be observed in
the fragments of Philolaus on the role of heat in embryol-
ogy.104 Since puppets are likenesses of real people, gods, or
heroes, and Plato has already connected them to magical
practices, his understanding and conceptualization of pup-
pets appear to have been along Pythagorean lines of the
“like attracts like” formulation.
There can be no doubt that Plato was directly influenced
by Pythagorean philosophy. The extent to which this was the
case may have been grossly underestimated. For example, J.
B. Kennedy has recently discovered a new layer of
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Pythagorean symbolism in the Platonic dialogues in terms of
their “musical structure” which corresponds to a
Pythagorean division of the musical canon into a 12-note
system.105 Kennedy argues that Plato used stichometric tech-
niques (word and line counting) to structure his dialogues so
that they corresponded to this monochord scale. He also ar-
gues that Plato embedded the 7-note, Orphic scale in his di-
alogues as well. The full significance of this will likely
become more apparent with time and greater research. At
the moment, and with the aid of information technology, it
is possible to observe certain “notes” in the dialogue that are
more consonant or more dissonant, thus revealing, at the
subtextual level, a modicum of the author’s intent. This can
be observed when more consonant notes fall at points in a
given dialogue where the important “messages,” if you will,
of the dialogue are situated and more dissonant ones appear
in proximity to themes/ individuals/ ideas with which Plato
takes issue (e.g., Gorgias and the Sophists, Alcibiades, Hera-
cleitan views). This discovery may have finally accounted for
the unusual structure of the Platonic dialogues which has in-
trigued scholars for centuries. The subject of the more overt
Pythagorean influences in Plato is too vast to be here ade-
quately discussed, although these can be consistently ob-
served throughout the Platonic corpus.106 The clearest
articulation of this connection is to be found in Aristotle’s
unambiguous assertion that Plato was “in most respects a
follower of the Pythagoreans.”107
In keeping with the Pythagorean theme, in book 7 of the
Laws, the Athenian Stranger posits a threefold definition of
affection based on likeness (affection between opposites, be-
tween those that are similar, and a mixed version of the
two).108 He is using here a sort of sliding scale between sim-
ple affection (philia) and erotic love (erôs), perhaps conflat-
ing the two as he has done elsewhere.109 Illustrating this, the
Athenian Stranger says that “whenever each one becomes in-
tense, we designate it erôs.”110 Of its three types, the most
harmonious version is said to occur in a non-physical manner
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between individuals who are most like one another in Good-
ness; “philia between those who are similar” is therefore
deemed superior. Such a relationship, the Athenian Stranger
says, is both “gentle and entails continuous, mutual affection
throughout life.”111 This definition favors non-corporeal,
“soul to soul” (Platonic) love which is considered to work
best in the achievement of the ideal telos of aretê. The notion
of “soul to soul” love (non-physical affection through like-
ness) in the Laws is also analogous to a view expressed in the
fragments of Empedokles—a Pythagorean philosopher par
excellence. Empedokles’ central doctrine of “like being
drawn to like” has been a fundamental and nearly universal
principle of magical beliefs from antiquity to modern
times.112 The attraction between “like and like” is part of a
cosmological dualism which necessitates therefore a repul-
sion between “unlikes,” which Plato also bears out in his def-
inition.113 On this affinity of “likes,” Empedokles wrote: “So
sweet lays hold of sweet, and bitter rushes to bitter; acid
comes to acid, and warm couples with warm.”114 This ex-
pression of Empedokles’ theory of attraction, in spite of (or
because of) its medical connotations, corresponds to Plato’s
second category of affection in the Laws—“between those
who are similar”—which is both “gentle and has continuous
mutual affection.”115 It is sometimes difficult to separate
Empedokles the philosopher from Empedokles the mystic; in-
deed the same can be said of Pythagoras, but perhaps for
them, there was no conflict between the two roles.116
The repulsion of opposites appears in the Athenian
Stranger’s disquisition on the “so-called Love” between op-
posites, which is described as “violent and unrestrained and
most often not reciprocated.”117 This connection between
Plato and Empedokles is further strengthened by the latter’s
doctrine of the cosmic principles of Love and Strife—part
and parcel of his theory of attraction and repulsion:
For all these—sun, earth, sky and sea—are one with the parts of
themselves that have been separated from them and born into mor-
Kenneth Royce Moore 133
Moore_29Sep2014_Layout 1  9/29/14  10:14 AM  Page 133
tal things. And even so all things that are more adapted for mixture
are like unto one another and united in Love by Aphrodite.118
Those things, again, that differ most in origin, in mixture, and in
their forms imprinted upon each are most hostile, being altogether
unaccustomed to unite and very sorry by the bidding of Strife, since
it has wrought their birth.119
In Empedoklean / Pythagorean tradition, as well as in many
(especially Orphic) magical operations throughout the an-
cient world, it was the interactions of the prime, operative
forces of Love (attraction) and Strife (repulsion) which were
seen, from Hesiod’s time onwards, as governing the underly-
ing functions of the universe.120 Theophrastus (372–287 bc),
a foremost disciple of Aristotle, took lines 6–7 of the above
fragment to indicate how pain results from the interaction of
opposites—not unlike the ensuing Strife that Plato considers
to result from relationships between people of opposite char-
acter.121 The activity of Love and Strife is similar to, and a
principal illustration of, their cosmic functions.122 Parts of
the four universal elements are said to be mixed with each
other in mortal things. Love and Strife are active in each.
Even after the initial creation, some things can still be com-
bined or re-combined and so Love makes them similar to
each other so that they “want” to come together.123 Other
material things cannot come together harmoniously and they
have a wretched existence due to the effects of Strife. 
The Pythagoreans maintained, in keeping with Dionysiac
and Orphic traditions, that there were certain actions which
one could undertake to effect a change in the process of
metempsychosis. Plutarch, himself an initiate of the Eleusin-
ian Mysteries and priest of Apollo at Delphi, reported that
the legends of the sufferings of Dionysos convey the mean-
ing of palingenesis or rebirth.124 Thus, perhaps, Plato’s
fondness for Dionysiac manias. The solution for Empedok-
les, and also for Plato, comes through the attainment of
wisdom. This appears to be the key to unlock the cycle of
perpetual expiatory rebirth for “blessed is the one who has
gained the riches of Divine Wisdom” and likewise
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“wretched is he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his
part.”125 Consider Meno 97d ff., where we are told that
opinions are inferior to knowledge as a guide for one who
would be wise, alongside Plato’s distinction between intel-
lection and opinion at Republic 534a. So too ought his
statements at Republic 479e ff. (and many other places be-
sides) be taken into account in light of Pythagorean influ-
ences when the literary Socrates describes the difference
between knowledge of “the Beautiful” and “the Just” as op-
posed to mere opinion about these. One who lacks true
Knowledge may “have opinions about all things, but know
nothing of the things about which they opine.”126 This Pla-
tonic correspondence with Pythagoreanism is strengthened
by Empedokles’ indication that “it is not possible for us to
set God before our eyes, or to lay hold of him with our
hands,” which is the manner by which most people are per-
suaded—through opinion and sensation.127
In Book 10 of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger engages in
a fairly familiar Platonic proof of the existence of soul and
its immortality. He also distinguishes the several types of
motion which can occur in nature until he arrives at that
which “moves itself.”128 Whenever this motion manifests it-
self “in earth, water, or fire—diversely or in combination . . .
we call it alive.”129 The Athenian Stranger indicates that
names and definitions both refer to a particular “being (tên
ousian)” and that he is seeking a definition for the “being”
whose name is “soul.”130 That which proves to be alive can
be said to have a soul. The Athenian Stranger concludes
that, because it can move itself, therefore the (reductive) def-
inition for soul is “that which itself has the power to set it-
self into motion.”131 (This derives in part from Thales of
Miletus who argued that magnets must have a soul since
they can move iron. Magnets were of special interest to the
Pre-Socratics, including Empedokles, for whom they figured
prominently in his formulation of magical phenomena.)132
The immortality of the soul is manifest in the fact that soul
is prior to body and that soul is part of (and emanates from)
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a universal soul which is the prime cause of all motion and
agency—including magical agency.133 This is a consistent
and well-discussed view throughout the Platonic corpus.134
The Athenian Stranger in the Laws reasons that “Soul is the
cause (aitia) of goodnesses and of evils, of beautiful things
and of shameful things, of justices and injustices and of all
things opposed to these—would we not be correct to posit
soul itself as the cause of everything?”135 The self-moved
motion of the universal psychê is said to be manifest in the
movements of stars and planets in the heavens. The Athen-
ian Stranger later insists that the guardians of his next-to-
ideal state should be able to prove the existence of soul, and
also of the Divine, by the same line of argument.136
There is a clear connection between Plato’s puppets and
Pythagorean likenesses being attracted to one another. Pup-
pets are likenesses of the entities that they represent, both as
the actual puppets and also, through Plato’s metaphor, at the
metaphysical level, by their connection with either the higher
Forms or with the baser, psychical components (which pre-
sumably must also have their metaphysical analogues). In
both Plato and in the Pythagorean views that we have, such
likeness is seen to have a reciprocal and interactive relation-
ship, effectively through magic. Plato’s puppets may take to
heart the lessons of Diotima’s Birth in Beauty speech, realiz-
ing that the only true affection is that for the Good; the good
in us is attracted to its rightful object, and we thereby yield
to the pull of the golden cord. Or they may also fail to be at-
tracted to its pull, perhaps lacking the Wisdom and logismos
appropriate to cultivate any such attraction to the Good—
perhaps lacking sufficient good within themselves?—pulled
instead by the baser elements, the iron strings, to which they
are more attracted. The metaphor itself operates through the
principle of likeness, referring to the puppets as likenesses
even further removed, but all connected through this for-
mula of representation being somehow bound up together
by magical “action at a distance.”
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as discussed at the beginning, puppets do not move them-
selves—at least, not the ordinary variety. Puppets, almost by
definition, are inanimate until animated. Human beings pos-
sess a psychê which is a self-moving mover, as we have seen,
thus making them thaumata theion in Plato’s formulation.
The metaphor of puppets is somewhat obscure and perhaps
deliberately so—possibly so that only those who are familiar
with Platonic metaphysics will correctly interpret it according
to these esoteric prescriptions. It has certainly been the ten-
dency of the Laws to reference the more complex metaphys-
ical ideas of the Platonic corpus without going into them in
any great detail, as if expecting the “right” reader to know
the cipher. Again, presumably those who have read Plato’s
other “manuals of philosophy,” and participated in dialectics
whereby the Many are shown to be One, will ascertain in it
the Pythagorean doctrine of “like attracts like,” whereas oth-
ers who are deprived of these teachings will not. 
The Puppets of the Gods metaphor is laden with complex
significance, as I have tried to demonstrate here. We have
seen that the cultural context of puppetry in Ancient Greece
entailed the mystical and the magical. It is also clear from
Plato’s writings, informed by Pythagorean views, that he
considered symbolic representations to possess magical qual-
ities through their likenesses to other things, both mundane
and divine. This would appear to be a consequence of their
partaking of the Forms, although it is never fully stated in
precisely those terms. If Plato believed that a wax manikin
could somehow be used to produce a negative, magical ef-
fect upon an individual through the magic of representation,
then puppets representing gods, heroes, or ordinary people
could also be considered to produce a real-world effect of
some type as well. A mundane puppet may be imbued with
such powers, but “divine marvels” are at least an order of
magnitude higher on the scale of being. What do “puppets
of the gods” then represent? They would seem to be no less
than the physical manifestation of the psychê, itself resident
in the realm of the Forms, being projected into the world of
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perceptual phenomena. They are “divine” in the sense that
individual psychai are each “at one” in some sense with the
universal psychê. In other words, for Plato, the human
“puppet,” through likeness, action at a distance, and partic-
ularly with its “golden c(h)ord,” represents no less than the
supreme divinity itself and, as such, is a marvel with which
one should not trifle. 
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